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With the enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 27 member states European integration has entered a new 
era. This new era involves challenges for all the member states. On the one hand, the old member states need to 
facilitate growth in the newcomers to enable them to increase their per capita incomes. At the same time, all the 
new member states (NM12) are required to join the EMU as in the Accession Treaty no opt-outs are permitted.
1 
And while EMU membership will undoubtedly be beneficial for all the EU economies in the long run, the loss of 
monetary independence may be costly in the short run for the newcomers if their macroeconomic shocks and 
business  cycles  are  not  sufficiently  symmetric  with  those  of  the  other  eurozone  participants.  The  optimum-
currency-areas (OCA) theory
2 emphasizes this point, suggesting that the major cost of sharing a common currency 
is the loss of monetary autonomy. When national business cycles are not synchronized enough and member states 
face asymmetric shocks, country-specific adjustment policies are needed and a common monetary policy cannot 
be  tailored  to  each  country’s  needs.  Indeed,  a  pressing  matter  for  EU  policymakers  today  is  to  what  extent 
similarity of shocks and business cycles across the twenty-seven member states can be expected to increase in the 
near future. In this respect, how the process of trade integration in Europe has influenced shock asymmetries and  
   2 
business-cycle patterns is crucial. Intra-EU trade has shown an upward trend since the start of the enlargement 
negotiations, and, as the literature on the trade effects of currency unions suggests
3, this upward trend is likely to 
continue with an expansion of EMU membership. Thus knowing whether or not trade integration reduces shock 
asymmetries and induces greater convergence of business cycles has important implications for assessing the 
success of an enlarged EMU.  
 
         In  the  international  economics  literature  there  is  an  ongoing  debate  as  to  whether  trade  integration 
accompanies  highly  correlated  business  cycles.  Emphasising  that  increased  trade  will  facilitate  specialization 
according  to  comparative  advantage,  Krugman  (1993)  and  Eichengreen  (1992)  have  pointed  to  a  negative 
association between more intense trade ties and cross-country synchrony of business cycles. Kalemli-Ozcan et.al. 
(2001, 2003) support this view, suggesting that the increased opportunities for income diversification, which result 
from economic integration, may lead to greater specialization in production and thus more asymmetric business-
cycle co-movements. Kose and Yi (2001), using a standard business-cycle model, also fail to establish a positive 
relation  between  larger  trade  flows  and  cross-country  symmetry  of  macroeconomic  fluctuations,  while  Imbs 
(2004) stresses that the overall impact of increased trade on business-cycle synchronization is ambiguous as trade 
integration affects national economies through a variety of channels.
4 Several other authors, however, emphasising 
international spill-over effects, have reached different conclusions. Frankel and Rose (1998) have been the first to 
find a large positive effect of more intense trade on cross-country synchrony of cyclical fluctuations, but evidence 
suggesting a favourable impact of trade on business-cycle correlations can also be found in, for example, De Haan 
et.al. (2002), Bordo and Hebling (2003), Inklaar et. al. (2005) and Calderόn et.al. (2002,2007). There also seems 
to be disagreement in the literature regarding whether overall bilateral trade or intra-industry trade is the most 
important factor in inducing synchronization of business cycles. Some authors point out that by increasing the 
diffusion of knowledge and technology and by being a major channel through which spending shocks are spread 
internationally, trade linkages in general (and thus overall bilateral-trade intensities) can play a role in  
strengthening business-cycle co-movements (see, for instance, Coe and Helpman (1995), Clark and van Wincoop 
(2001), Ambler et. al. (2002) and Bergman (2005)). Others argue that trade within the same industries (intra-
industry trade), not overall bilateral trade, is the key factor which, through industry-specific productivity spill-
overs  and  income  transfers,  determines  the  degree  to  which  business-cycle  fluctuations  across  countries  can 
become more synchronized (see, for example, Imbs (2001, 2004), Fidrmuc (2004) and Shin and Wang (2005)). 
 
         Much of this literature examines cross-country output or industrial-production co-movements paying  no 
attention to the association between trade integration and symmetry of demand and supply shocks. However, 
exploring how trade flows affect diversity of shocks across economies is important, given that shock similarity is a 
crucial determinant of the degree of synchronization of national business cycles. Indeed, the way in which closer 
trade may affect cross-country business-cycle co-movements can be better understood if the association between 
increased trade ties and correlations of demand and supply shocks is separately and explicitly examined.  
 
      This paper explores the relation between convergence of shocks and trade using data from the EU27
5 countries 
covering the period 1995Q1-2005Q4. The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, it attempts to add to the existing  
   3 
literature  on  business-cycle  synchrony  by  directly  examining  convergence  of  macroeconomic  shocks  and  by 
assessing within this context the role of both overall bilateral trade and intra-industry trade. Second, by exploring 
how  the  upward  trend  in  intra-European  trade,  which  we  have  observed  in  recent  years,  has  affected  shock 
correlations and has thus shaped business-cycle patterns, it attempts to provide evidence regarding the prospects 
for business-cycle convergence in the enlarged European Union.  The issue is important for the debate on the right 
timing of EMU entry by all NM12, given that the OCA theory predicts that intra-EU27 trade is likely to increase 
further with a rise in eurozone membership. 
 
        
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical literature on the association 
between trade integration and synchrony of macroeconomic fluctuations and considers trade flows within EU27. 
In Section 3 we proceed to identify demand and supply shocks in each of the EU27 economies, employing a 
structural-VAR methodology along the lines suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Following that, correlation 
coefficients for the identified structural demand and supply shocks versus Germany, France and the eurozone are 
computed  and  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  such  correlations  and  trade  flows  is  examined.  Since 
similarity of economic policies may influence cross-country symmetry of shocks independently of trade flows, 
policy integration is also considered. We consider three different samples: the EU27 member states, pooling two 
sub-periods of equal length (1996q1-2000q4 and 2001q1-2005q4); only the EU15 group, pooling the same two 
sub-periods; and the EU27 for the second, more recent, sub-period 2001q1-2005q4. Section 4 contains concluding 
comments. 
 
       
  In all our samples, increased overall trade is found to have a strong positive effect on the correlations of both 
demand and supply shocks. Intra-industry trade is found to be significantly and positively linked to correlations of 
supply-side shocks but negatively linked to correlations of demand shocks. In this respect, our results provide 
support for the argument that international spill-overs, via aggregate productivity and spending channels and via 
industry-specific technological and income transfers, rather than specialization, dominate in the process through 
which trade affects the transmission of shocks across the EU. They also implicitly provide evidence in favour of 
the endogeneity approach to the OCA criteria, namely that the criterion of similarity of shocks can be satisfied ex 
post. In particular, to the extent that our results suggest that more intense overall intra-EU trade would imply both 
less  asymmetric  demand  shocks  and  less  asymmetric  supply  shocks,  then,  provided  that  intra-EU27  trade 
continues on an upward trend, the process of European integration should lead to more synchronized national 
business cycles. From this point of view, our results provide evidence in support of a quick entry of all NM12 into 
the EMU to the extent that, as much of the literature on the trade effects of currency unions indicates, an expanded 
EMU  can  be  expected  to  further  boost  intra-EU27  trade.  At  the  same  time,  our  estimates  indicate  that  the 
circulation of the euro has been associated with increased symmetry of supply-side shocks in Europe but has had 
no direct favourable impact on symmetry of demand shocks. By contrast, the process of fiscal-policy convergence 
is found to have resulted in more correlated demand shocks across the EU27 member states. As far as interest-rate 
convergence is concerned, our results reveal that it has been accompanied in general with greater symmetry of 
shocks within the EU15 group. 
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2. BUSINESS CYCLES AND TRADE FLOWS 
         2.1. The empirical literature 
Much of the empirical literature on the link between trade and business-cycle synchronization focuses on the 
impact of trade integration on cross-country cyclical co-movements of some measure of real economic activity, 
such  as  output,  industrial  production,  employment  or  unemployment.  The  evidence  is  mixed,  both  as  far  as 
whether trade induces synchronization and as far as whether overall-bilateral trade or intra-industry trade is the 
key factor influencing output co-movements. There also seems to be conflicting conclusions regarding the effect 
of policy convergence on cyclical symmetry.  
 
        A seminal study in this literature is Frankel and Rose (1998). Using data from 21 industrial countries over the 
period 1959-1993, Frankel and Rose (1998) examined the extent to which co-movements of quarterly real-GDP 
growth, industrial production growth, employment  growth and unemployment could be explained by average 
bilateral trade flows (normalized by total trade or nominal GDP). Determinants of international trade from gravity 
models (i.e. distance between countries, geographic adjacency and common language), which were uncorrelated 
with  policy  co-ordination,  were  used  as  instrumental  variables  for  overall  bilateral-trade  intensity  in  their 
regressions.  Their  estimates  suggested  a  strong  positive  effect  of  increased  overall  trade  on  correlations  of 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Employing the Frankel-Rose (1998) methodology, several other papers, including 
Calderόn  et.  al.  (2002,  2007),  De  Haan  et.  al  (2002)  and  Bordo  and  Hebling  (2003),  confirmed  the  strong 
association between trade intensity and business-cycle synchronization. In particular, Calderόn et. al. (2002) found 
evidence  of  a  significant  positive  effect  of  trade  on  business-cycle  correlations  for  OECD  countries,  while 
Calderόn et. al. (2007) confirmed the existence of a statistically significant, although weaker, link between trade 
and output co-movements for a sample of 147 developing countries. On the other hand, Baxter and Kouparitsas 
(2004)  confirmed  the  robustness  of  the  proposition  that  overall  trade  intensity  increases  business-cycle 
correlations using Leamers’ (1983) extreme-bound approach and a large sample of both developed and developing 
countries.  
 
         Gruben et. al. (2002) refined the Frankel-Rose specification. Pointing out that the instruments for trade 
intensity employed by Frankel and Rose (1998) were inappropriate, due to their possible association with omitted 
variables, they included gravity variables directly into their regressions. They also decomposed the total trade-
intensity variable into inter-industry and intra-industry intensity. Their findings were consistent with the general 
argument of a positive relation between closer trade links and synchrony of business cycles, but their estimates 
suggested that the Frankel-Rose coefficients of overall trade intensity were biased upwards. At the same time, 
Gruben  et.  al.  (2002)  found  no  evidence  in  support  of  the  Krugman  (1993)  specialization  hypothesis,  as  no 
significant negative effect of greater inter-industry trade on business-cycle correlations was detected. Inklaar et.al.  
(2005), also arguing against using an instrumental-variable methodology due to bias resulting from the effects of 
omitted variables, included as explanatory variables in their regressions for 21 OECD countries specialization and 
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policy integration, in addition to total bilateral trade. Their results suggested a significant association between 
bilateral-trade intensity and cross-country business-cycle synchrony, although the association was weaker than in 
Frankel and Rose (1998) as other factors in their model, including policy integration, also had an impact on 
business-cycle correlations. 
 
        Using cyclical industrial-production as well as real-output data as measures of business-cycle fluctuations in 
OECD during the 1990s, Fidrmuc (2004) extended the Frankel-Rose (1998) specification by incorporating directly 
as explanatory variables in his regressions both total bilateral trade and intra-industry trade. For all the measures of 
cyclical fluctuations, the coefficients of the overall bilateral-trade intensity were found close to zero (or with 
negative  signs).  By  contrast,  the  intra-industry-trade  coefficients  were  positive  and  significant  in  most 
specifications, thus identifying trade within the same industries, rather than overall bilateral trade, as the key 
determinant of cross-country convergence of macroeconomic fluctuations. Garnier (2004), on the basis of spectral 
analysis, reported only a weak effect of intra-industry trade on synchronization, but evidence broadly in line with 
Fidrmuc  (2004)  was  found  by  Imbs  (2001,  2004).  Using  simultaneous  equation  techniques  and  a  dataset 
containing 18 countries over the period 1983Q1-1998Q3, Imbs (2004) considered as a factor influencing output 
co-movements an index of similarity in  national industrial structures, a  variable highly correlated  with intra-
industry trade. His results implied a strong positive association between this index and output co-movements and 
only a low effect of overall trade on business-cycle symmetry. The Imbs (2004) findings were not confirmed by 
the studies of Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Otto et.al. (2001), which, using data from 17 OECD countries 
and from 14 EU countries plus the US respectively, found evidence broadly in line with that in Frankel and Rose 
(1998). That is, the effect of overall bilateral trade was revealed to be positive and statistically significant even 
when controlling for similarity of industrial structures, with the industrial-similarity index in Otto et al. (2001) 
being insignificant in some of their specifications. The results of Imbs (2004) were also not confirmed by Baxter 
and Kouparitsas (2004) who failed to establish a robust relation (in Leamer’s (1983) terms) between sectoral 
similarity  and  business-cycle  co-movements.  Also,  Traistaru  (2004),  in  examining  business-cycle  synchrony 
between the eurozone and several CEECs, found the bilateral-trade-intensity variable, in addition to the industrial-
similarity index, to be always positively and significantly related to cross-country output co-movements.  
 
        Several authors have examined the role of monetary- and fiscal-policy coordination, in addition to trade, in 
cross-country cyclical synchronization. Shin and Wang (2005), in his panel regressions for 14 European countries, 
could  detect  no  significant  effect  of  fiscal-policy  convergence  on  output  co-movements.  Also,  the  impact  of 
monetary-policy convergence was sensitive to the proxy used, with cross-country correlations of M2 growth rates 
having  no  effect  on  synchronization  while  correlation  of  short-term  interest  rates  appearing  as  an  important 
determinant of synchrony of cyclical GDP fluctuations. As far as trade is concerned, the overall trade-intensity 
coefficients, like in Fidrmurc (2001), were found significant only when intra-industry trade was not included in the 
regressions. Bergman (2004), based on a sample of industrial-production co-movements in EU-15, Canada, Japan, 
Norway, Switzerland and the US, found evidence suggesting that fiscal-policy convergence increases cyclical 
synchrony across national economies but a common monetary policy decreases synchrony. At the same time, 
bilateral trade intensity was always significant in explaining business-cycle synchronization in Bergman’s (2005) 
specifications,  even  when  fiscal-  and  monetary-policy  co-ordination  variables  were  included  in  the  model.   6 
Conflicting conclusions regarding the effects of monetary- and fiscal-policy similarity are also reported in several 
other studies. Clark and Van Wincoop (2001) could detect no significant direct effect of policy co-ordination in 
general on business cycle synchronization, while Camacho et al. (2005), based on a sample of OECD countries, 
found evidence indicating that fiscal but not monetary policy affects cyclical synchronization. By contrast, the 
estimates of Inklaar et al. (2005) suggested that both monetary- and fiscal-policy similarity had a positive and 
significant effect on cross-country output co-movements. 
 
        Babetskii (2005) is to our knowledge the only existing paper that focuses directly on the link between trade 
and cross-country asymmetries of shocks, rather than asymmetries in cyclical fluctuations of output or industrial 
production. Using data from seven CEECs plus Spain, Portugal and Ireland for the period 1990Q1-2002Q4 and a 
structural-VAR methodology, he first identified demand and supply shocks in these economies and then examined 
how  time-varying  correlation  coefficients  of  shocks  versus  Germany  (or  the  EU15)  were  affected  by  overall 
bilateral-trade intensities. His estimates implied a positive effect of total bilateral trade on cross-country symmetry 
of demand shocks. The impact of more intense bilateral trade on supply-shock symmetry could not be established. 
Also, the role of intra-industry trade and of policy convergence was not considered. As a result, the different 
channels through which increased international trade might have affected similarity of different types of shocks in 
these countries were not explored. 
 
        We add to this literature in two ways: we directly examine the association between shock asymmetries and 
overall bilateral trade intensities, controlling at the same time for intra-industry trade and policy convergence; and 
we  use  recent  trade  data  from  all  the  twenty-seven  European-Union  countries  to  derive  policy  implications 
regarding the success of an expanded EMU.  
 
         2.2. Intra-EU trade flows 
Intra-European trade increased in almost all the EU15 member states since the beginning of the 1990s, following 
the decision to adopt a common currency, and also since 1995 following the start of the enlargement discussions. 
Between 1991 and 1995, exports as a percentage of GDP within the EU15 increased by 43% and imports by 39%. 
Between 1996 and 2007, intra-EU27 exports increased on average for the EU15 countries as a group by 26.1 
percent (from 19.9% of GDP to 25.1%) and intra-EU27 imports by 24.0 percent (from 19.2% of GDP to 23.8%). 
Of  the  six  original  EU  member  states,  Germany,  Belgium-Luxemburg  (taken  together)  and  the  Netherlands 
showed the biggest increase in intra-EU27 exports (98.3%, 57.2% and 47.0% respectively), while France followed 
with an increase of  25.6% for exports and 37.8% for imports (see Table 1 and Figure 1). As regards the other 
EU15 states, intra-EU27 exports to GDP increased by 70.3% in Austria, by 31.2% in Denmark, by between 25% 
and 15% in Sweden, Finland and Italy and by around 5% in Spain and Portugal. The rise in intra-EU27 imports to 
GDP over the same period amounted to between 50% and 25% in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Italy, and by 
between 10% and 15% in Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. Only Greece and Ireland experienced a drop in 
both intra-EU exports and imports as a percentage of GDP and the UK a drop in intra-EU exports. 
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Table 1 Intra-EU27 Trade of the EU15 countries (% of GDP) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  Intra-EU exports  Intra-EU imports 
  1996  2007  1996  2007 
AU  15.8  26.9  21.5  31.3 
BE/L  45.1  70.9  40.0  63.6 
DEN  18.6  24.4  17.3  21.7 
FIN  17.4  20.2  15.9  21.4 
FR  12.1  15.2  12.7  17.5 
GER  12.3  24.4  11.3  20.3 
GR  5..0  4.0  14.6  13.1 
IR  43.5  34.1  31.1  23.2 
IT  11.1  13.2  10.1  13.1 
NETH  40.0  58.8  28.1  31.4 
POR  16.3  17.0  22.8  25.6 
SP  11.1  11.7  13.5  15.5 
SWE  17.8  21.9  16.8  22.8 
UK  12.5  9.3  13.0  13.1 
EU15  19.9  25.1  19.2  23.8 
____________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  based on Eurostat  data.  AU = Austria, BE/L= Belgium/Luxemburg, DEN = Denmark, FIN = Finland, FR = France, 
GER = Germany, GR = Greece, IR = Ireland, IT = Italy, NETH = Netherlands, POR = Portugal, SP = Spain,  
SWE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom  
 
 
Notes: based on Table 1 
 
          As far as the NM12 are concerned, their EU trade has increased considerably since 1995, and especially after 
1999, following the enlargement process. Between 1995 and 1998 intra-EU27 exports and imports increased in the 
NM12 as a group by 13% and 8.5% respectively. Between 1999 and 2007, intra-EU27 exports to GDP increased by 
approximately 80% in the case of Poland, Lithuania and Cyprus, by between 50% and 40% in the case of Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia, and by 29.2% and 21.3% in Hungary and Latvia respectively. Imports from 
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Figure 1  Intra-EU trade of the EU15 countries ( % of GDP), percentage change between 
1996 and 2007 
exports  imports   8 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland, by 30.5% and 23.9% respectively in Estonia and Hungary and by 20.0% in 
Latvia. Only Malta experienced a drop in intra-EU27 exports as a percentage of GDP and a small increase in intra-
EU27 imports (see Table 2 and Figure 2). In Bulgaria and Romania exports to the European Union increased from 
16.6 and 13.9 percent of GDP respectively in 1999 to 26.4% and 23.3% in 2007. Intra-EU imports in these two 
countries have also been rising, from 17.6% of GDP in Bulgaria and 18.9% Romania in 1999 to, respectively, 27.3% 
and 29.9% in 2007.  
 
Table 2 Intra-EU Trade of the New Member States (% of GDP) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  Intra-EU exports  Intra-EU imports 
  1999  2007  1999  2007 
CY  3.6  6.6  18.1  28.5 
CZ  38.3  57.5  36.2  50.4 
EST  36.1  50.9  43.9  57.3 
HU  41.8  54.0  40.2  49.8 
LAT  18.3  22.2  30.5  36.6 
LITH  18.5  34.5  25.5  40.7 
MA  24.3  21.2  47.2  49.6 
POL  13.2  25.0  19.6  27.6 
SLOV  27.1  41.9  35.9  51.4 
SK  43.9  67.4  40.9  58.8 
BU  16.6  26.4  17.6  27.3 
ROM  13.9  23.3  18.9  29.9 
NM12  24.6  35.9  31.2  42.3 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: based on Eurostat  data. BU = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, CZ= Czech Republic, EST = Estonia,  
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Figure 2  Intra-EU trade of the NM12 (% of GDP), percentage change between 1996 and  
2007 
exports  imports   9 
         Intra-EU27 trade is likely to increase further with an expansion of EMU membership. A common currency 
eliminates the risk of exchange-rate volatility among the participating states and reduces the uncertainty involved 
in trade transactions within the group. Thus, with the entry of all the NM12 into the EMU, trade across Europe can 
be expected to rise. Some authors focusing on the impact of exchange-rate volatility on trade suggest that this 
effect may be small.
6   Others, however, stress that exchange-rate stability is not a substitute for sharing a common 
currency and that entering a currency union has a substantially stronger effect on trade than eliminating exchange-
rate volatility and still using national currencies.
  This is because a currency union leads to permanently lower 
transaction  costs  in  trade,  greater  price  transparency,  increased  competition  among  firms  and  a  long-term 
commitment to common objectives and economic policies.
 7  Rose (2000), the first paper to investigate empirically 
the direct impact of currency unions on trade, found, on the basis of a cross-section of 186 countries, that pairs of 
countries participating in currency unions traded with each other about three times more than countries which 
retained their national currencies. Glick and Rose (2002) extended Rose’s (2000) analysis by examining trade in 
217 countries over a period of 50 years, controlling at the same time for a large number of factors that, from 
gravity models, might influence trade. Their panel estimates suggested a lower, but still large, positive effect of 
currency unions on trade, ranging between 65% and 100%.
8,9 Using historical data from the gold-standard period 
(thus having large countries in pairs involved in currency unions in their sample), Estavadeordal et.al. (2002) and 
Lopez-Cόrdova  and  Meissner  (2002)  also  found  a  strong  currency-union  effect  on  trade,  of  about  the  same 
magnitude as in Glick and Rose (2002) (that is, between 34% and 72%, and up to 60%, respectively). Indeed, the 
Rose and Stanley (2005) meta-analysis of the effects of currency unions on trade, has indicated that, although the 
magnitude  of  the  effect  varies  considerably  across  the  different  studies,  combining  the  estimates  produces  a 
statistically significant effect between 30% and 90%. Recently, using post-2000 data and controlling for other 
standard influences on trade flows, several studies have attempted to estimate the trade effects of EMU.
10 Most of 
them confirm that the EMU has boosted trade, indicating that the effect is not only statistically significant but also 
economically noticeable, although smaller compared to that implied from panel studies based on historical data.
 
For instance, euro’s short-run effect on trade has been estimated between 4% and 16% in Micco et al. (2003), 
between  9%  and  10%  in  De  Nardis  and  Vicarelli  (2004)  and  about  10%  in  Faruqeé (2004),  while  Bun  and 
Klaassen (2002) using a dynamic panel model suggest a longer-run
11 effect of EMU on trade of about 40%.
 
 
       If currency unions can indeed be expected to boost trade, then knowing whether or not trade integration also 
accompanies  greater  symmetry  of  shocks  and  business  cycles  is  important.  If  trade  integration  does  lead  to 
reduced shock asymmetries, the loss for prospective union members of monetary independence will be less costly: 
by entering the currency union, their trade with the other member states will increase and this increase in trade will 
in turn facilitate shock convergence and symmetry of business cycles within the group, thus requiring no country-
specific adjustment policies. In the case of Europe the issue is crucial.  Since the effect of EMU on trade appears 
significant and economically noticeable, whether or not larger trade flows also reduce shock asymmetries and 
increase synchronization of business cycles is important for assessing the success or failure of a quick expansion 
of EMU membership and thus an early adoption of the euro by all the NM12.
12 The issue is also important for the 
EU15 countries that have not yet joined the eurozone, namely the UK, Sweden and Denmark. In general, even if 
they do not meet the criterion of shock similarity ex ante, they are likely to achieve it ex post to the extent that   10 
union membership would increase their trade with the other members and this, in turn, would induce greater 
synchronization of business cycles.  
 
 
3. CONVERGENCE OF SHOCKS AND TRADE: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
3.1. Identifying structural demand and supply shocks 
Fluctuations in real output and prices can be assumed to result from both demand and supply innovations, with 
the former having a permanent effect only on prices while the latter having a permanent effect on both prices 
and output. Such demand and supply innovations can be recovered from a 2x2 vector auto-regression (VAR) for 
each country involving real-GDP growth and GDP-deflator growth by imposing restrictions on the system’s 
estimated coefficients along the lines suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989).
13 More specifically, current 
real-output  growth  (inflation)  can  be  assumed  to  be  influenced  by  contemporaneous  inflation  (real  output 
growth) and by past real-output growth rates and inflation rates:  
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where εd and εs are (white-noise) structural demand and supply shocks respectively, Θi are 2x2 coefficient 
matrices,  (.) is the difference operator, yt (pt) is (the log of) the current real GDP (GDP deflator), and  y )
and 
p )
represent steady-state values. (1.1) can be taken to represent a Keynesian-type system of aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply schedules with nominal rigidities, with εd and εs being innovations relating, respectively, 
to the demand- and supply-side of the economy. Solving for Xt , (1.1) becomes 
 





− = Θ  and 
1
i o i A
− = Θ Θ  for i = 1,2,…. From (1.2), through appropriate substitutions, current 
deviations of real-GDP growth and GDP-deflator growth from initial steady-state values can be explained by the 
contemporaneous and the lagged effects of the structural demand and supply shocks: 
 




t t t t t t i t
i




Χ = Β +Β +Β +Β + = Β + Β ∑                             (1.3) 
   11 
where L
i is the lag operator (with 
i
t t i Lε ε − = ), o o B A = and the Bi’s (for  i  = 1, 2…) are 2x2 coefficient 
matrices representing the lagged effects of shocks on  y and  p. Assuming that a demand shock cannot have 
any long-run impact on real-output growth implies that   
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where  11,o β  and  11,i β  are elements (1, 1) of the matrices Bo and  i B  respectively.  
 
     Using ordinary least squares (1.2) can be estimated as a VAR.
 Having estimated the VAR, the structural 
demand and supply shocks can then be identified from the residuals. In particular, the estimated VAR can be 
expressed as: 
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where et is the vector of  residuals and the Ci ’s (for i = 1,2 .. ) are 2x2 matrices of estimated coefficients. Given 
(1.3)  and  (2),  the  contemporaneous  structural  shocks  εt  can  be  derived  from  the  residuals  et  using  the 
relationship
1
t o t B e ε
− = .  To find εt, the Bo matrix needs to be computed. This can be achieved by imposing 
restrictions on its elements. As Bo is a 2x2 matrix, four restrictions are required. The first restriction comes from 
the proposition that a demand shock can exert no long-run influence on output growth, namely from (1.4). The 
other three restrictions come from the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. For this matrix, Ψ, we have 
' ' ' '
0 0 0 0 ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) t t t t t t ee ε ε ε ε Ψ = Ε = Ε Β ⋅ Β = Β Ε Β .Two restrictions follow from normalizing the variance of 
the  structural  shocks  εdt  and  εst  to  unity,  while  the  third  comes  from  the  proposition  that,  by  definition,
14 
structural demand and supply shocks in (1.1) are contemporaneously orthogonal. Accordingly, Ψ can be written 
as 
'
0 0 Ψ = Β Β , from which, given E(et e’t) from the estimated VAR, the elements of Bo, and thus εdt and εst, 
can be computed.  
 
     A VAR like (1.2) has been estimated, using quarterly real output-growth data (GDP at constant, 1995 
prices) and inflation data (GDP-deflator, 1995=100), for each of the EU27 countries and for the eurozone as a 
whole. The data (seasonally unadjusted, except for Greece and Portugal) are from Eurostat covering the period 
1995Q1-2005Q4, except for Ireland, Malta, Lithuania and Romania for which appropriate quarterly real-GDP 
series are available only from 1999Q1 onwards
15 (see Table A.5). The Akaike and Schwarz criteria for lag 
structure  suggested  the  inclusion  of  3  to  4  lags  for  most  countries,  and  for  all  the  estimated  VARs  the 
eigenvalues of the system’s estimated matrix were inside the unit circle thus ensuring stability. The impulse-
response functions also suggested consistency of the estimated VARs with the underlying economic model, i.e. 
in all the estimated VARs, except for Denmark, the accumulated response to a positive demand shock and a 
positive supply shock was, respectively, an increase and a decrease in inflation (see Figure A.1).
16,17 Short-run 
responses to the identified structural shocks, except for Denmark
18, were also in accordance with economic 
theory (i.e. a positive demand shock would increase both inflation and output-growth in the short run while a   12 
positive supply shock would reduce inflation and increase output growth). Table A.1 shows summary statistics 
for the identified structural shocks, indicating that they tend to be equally distributed
19 between positive and 
negative values.
  On the basis of the identified structural shocks, shock-correlation coefficients for each of the 
EU27 countries versus Germany, France and the eurozone have then been computed for two sub-sample periods 
of equal length, namely 1996q1-2000q4 and 2001q1-2005q4. Pooling the two sub-sample periods yields the plot 


























   3.2. Trade intensity and intra-industry trade 
Trade intensity between trading partners i and j can be measured in terms of bilateral trade turnover (exports plus 
imports) scaled by total trade or nominal GDP: 
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where Xi and Mi ( (Xj , Mj) refer to total exports and imports of  partner i (partner j) and Yi (Yj) to nominal GDP, 
while Xii (Mij) are the bilateral exports (imports) of i and j. Thus, a higher value for TRADE1ij,τ  or TRADE2ij,τ  
would indicate greater trade intensity between trading partners i and j. (3) has been computed from quarterly data 
from Eurostat (see Table A.5), with τ referring to the period-average under consideration.
20, 21  
 
       An index of intra-industry trade (INTRAij,τ) is constructed along the lines suggested by Grubel and Lloyd 
(1975):   13 
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where κ is the number of industrial branches. (4) has been computed using industry-disaggregated quarterly data 
at the SITC-2 level from Eurostat, with the disaggregation involving 70 industries.
22 Larger intra-industry trade 
flows would reduce the numerator in ωij,τ, so INTRAij,τ  would increase as more intra-industry trade takes place. 
Summary statistics for TRADE and INTRA are shown in Table A.2.
23 
 
          3.3. The association between trade and shock symmetry 
 In the light of the existing literature, we can consider two conflicting propositions regarding the association 
between  trade  flows  and  symmetry  of  shocks.  The  first  follows  from  the  specialization  hypothesis  of,  for 
example,  Krugman  (1993)  and  Kalemli-Ozcan  et.al.  (2001):  closer  trade  links  will  facilitate  increased 
specialization in production. In such a case, asymmetries of supply-side shocks across national economies can 
be expected to rise as trade integration progresses. The second hypothesis follows from the argument about 
international spill-over effects and from the new theory of international trade (see, for instance, Frankel and 
Rose (1998), Coe and Helpman (2001) and Ambler et al. (2002)). Trade between national economies increases 
the diffusion of knowledge and technology and therefore can be expected to result in a more rapid transmission 
of aggregate productivity shocks. Trade is also a major channel through which aggregate spending and income 
shocks are spread internationally. Thus, as overall bilateral-trade intensities increase, these spill-overs increase, 
something implying that similarity of both supply and demand shocks can be expected to rise. At the same time, 
trade among several economies appears to be increasingly taking place within the same industries. In such cases, 
increased overall trade will also imply more intense intra-industry trade. More intense intra-industry trade will 
in turn lead to less export specialization and greater similarity of industrial structures across national economies 
and thus more comparable supply-side shocks, through intra-industry spending transfers and industry-specific 
technological spill-overs.     
 
 These propositions have testable implications. On the basis of our sample, if international spill-overs are 
dominant and the argument about intra-industry trade is correct, overall bilateral-trade intensities should be 
positively and significantly related to cross-country correlations of both demand and supply shocks: to demand 
shocks  through  aggregate  spending  and  income  spill-overs,  and  to  supply-side  shocks  through  aggregate 
productivity  spill-overs  and  through  similarity  of  industrial  branches.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  specialization 
dominates, increased overall bilateral trade should be negatively associated with cross-country correlations of 
supply-side shocks but may still have a positive impact on correlations of demand shocks through income and 
spending spill-overs. At the same time, when introduced together with total bilateral trade, more intense intra-
industry trade, while being positively linked to supply-shock correlations due to cross-country similarity of 
industrial branches, it can be expected to be negatively related to correlations of aggregate demand shocks to the 
extent that it would imply relatively large industry-specific transfers rather than large aggregate spending spill-
overs.  
   14 
  3.4.   Regression results: trade flows and similarity of shocks  
As we pool two sub-sample periods, time-varying characteristics, other than those reflected in the variables 
TRADEij,τ and INTRAij,τ may have had an impact on shock correlations. In the case of the countries in our 
sample, an important time-varying characteristic is monetary- and fiscal-policy similarity across Europe, which 
increased as the date for the replacement of national currencies by the euro was approaching.  To account for 
this,  we  consider  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable  a  dummy  (EURO)  that  takes  the  value  1  for  all 
observations in the period 1996Q1-2000Q4, when all the EU27 member states still had their national currencies, 
and the value 0 in the 2001Q1-2005Q4 period, which was characterized by the free circulation of the euro 
across the whole of Europe (even along national currencies in countries like the UK, Denmark and Sweden, 
which did not participate in the eurozone). Alternatively, the discrepancy of short-term interest rates between 
trading partners i and j (RATESij,τ = |ri –rj|τ) and the correlation of their budget deficits  (BUDGETij,τ) are used 
respectively  as  proxies  for  monetary-  and  fiscal-policy  convergence/divergence.  Including  directly  into  the 
regressions  policy-convergence  variables,  which  themselves  may  have  influenced  shock  symmetry 
independently of trade flows, also controls for potential simultaneity between trade and shocks (due to both 
being affected by policy).
24 The data for RATES and BUDGET are from Eurostat, Government Statistics and 
Interest Rates respectively (summary statistics are shown in Table A.2). Short-term interest rates refer to six-
month money-market rates, while the budget data refer to annual deficits as percentage of GDP. To account for 
any likely effect on shock symmetry of economic size, the (log) of GDP discrepancy between trading partners 
(DINCij,τ = log|Yi  –Yj|τ ) has also be considered as explanatory variable. As much of the international economics 
literature suggests (see, e.g., Fidrmuc (2004)), larger economies may have a stronger influence on the shocks 
facing smaller economies, in which case DINC will enter the regressions with a positive sign. DINC has been 




TABLE 3.1, TABLE 3.2 
 
       Regression  results  for  the  EU27  from  pooling  the  two  sub-sample  periods,  1996q1-2000q4  and  2001q1-
2005q4, are summarized in Tables 3.1 to 3.3. The estimates suggest that there are important links between trade 
flows and cross-country symmetry of shocks, although the nature of the linkages differs depending on the source 
of the disturbances. In columns (a) and (f) of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 there is evidence of a strong positive association 
between  greater  overall  bilateral  trade  and  symmetry  of  demand  as  well  as  supply  shocks.  The  estimated 
coefficients of both measures of bilateral trade intensity in (3) have a positive sign, are highly significant (1%) and 
large in magnitude.
25 Nevertheless, from this, one cannot identify the channels through which more intense trade 
ties influence shock correlations. Thus, in all the other columns of Tables 3.1 and 3.2, overall bilateral trade 
intensity and intra-industry trade are introduced separately as explanatory variables. With both TRADE and INTRA 
included in the regressions, the TRADE variable can be taken to capture the effects of inter-industry, and thus 
specialized, trade.   
 
         In  the  case  of  demand-shock  convergence,  controlling  for  intra-industry  trade  has  little  impact  on  the 
estimated  overall-bilateral-trade-intensity  coefficients.  In  columns  (b)  and  (g)  of  Table  3.1,  these  coefficients   15 
remain positive, highly significant, and large in magnitude. By contrast, the coefficients of the intra-industry-trade 
variable have a negative sign, suggesting that more intense intra-industry trade does not by itself imply greater 
cross-country symmetry of demand shocks. On the other hand, in columns (b) and (g) of Table 3.2, the intra-
industry-trade  index  enters  with  a  positive  sign  and  is  highly  significant  independently  of  how  overall  trade 
intensity is defined. 
 The estimated coefficients of the overall bilateral-trade-intensity variable, although they drop 
relative to columns (a) and (f), remain positive and significant (at 10 or 5 percent) for both measures of (3).
  These 
results are robust with respect to changes in the specification of the regressions by including other variables. 
Controlling for the circulation of the euro and for fiscal-policy convergence and interest-rate differences does not 
affect the direction of the trade effects, while at the same time increases the significance of the estimated trade 
coefficients and the goodness-of-fit of the regressions. Thus, for the case of demand shocks, in columns (c) to (e) 
and (h) to (j) of Table 3.1 the bilateral-trade-intensity coefficients are still highly significant (1%) regardless of the 
inclusion  of  EURO,  BUDGET  or  RATES,  while  the  coefficients  of  intra-industry-trade  are  all  negative  and 
significant at 5 or 10 percent. For the supply-shock correlations in columns (c) to (e) and (h) to (j) of Table 3.2, the 
coefficients of intra-industry trade are positive and highly significant (1%) in all specifications. The estimated 
coefficients of overall-bilateral-trade intensity are also positive and significant (at 5% or 10%), independently of 
the different measures of (3).  
   
       Our  results  thus  suggest  that  international  spill-overs,  rather  than  specialization,  dominate  in  the  process 
through  which  more  intense  inter-industry  trade  affects  symmetry  of  supply-side  shocks  across  the  enlarged 
European Union. From this point of view, they provide evidence in support of a Coe-Helpman (2001) and Frankel-
Rose (1998) type of effect, rather than a Krugman-type (1993) effect, of trade on convergence of business cycles. 
In particular, the fact that the overall trade-intensity variable is positively and significantly linked to both the 
supply-shock and the demand-shock correlations even when intra-industry trade is included in the regressions, 
suggests  that  specialized  trade  (inter-industry  trade)  has  on  balance  correlation-increasing  effects  through 
international spill-overs.  At a more general level, the results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide an explanation for the 
mixed evidence in the empirical literature regarding the association between cross-country cyclical co-movements 
of output on the one hand, and overall bilateral trade and intra-industry trade, on the other. They suggest that more 
intense overall bilateral trade would tend to be positively and strongly associated  with correlations of output 
growth or industrial-production growth when the driving force of business cycles is a demand innovation. The 
association, while still positive, would be weaker if the main cause of business cycles is a supply-side innovation. 
At the same time, intra-industry trade would tend to be positively and strongly associated with tighter cross-
country output co-movements when cycles are mainly the result of supply-side shocks. It would have little impact 
on synchronization of output fluctuations, and could even lead to less synchronization, when cycles are caused 
primarily by demand innovations. 
 
         On the other hand, the estimates in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggest that policy convergence, in addition to trade, 
has also been responsible for determining the degree of shock symmetry in Europe. EURO is highly significant 
(1%) in all the regressions of supply-shock convergence in Table 3.2 and is also significant at 5% or 10% in the 
demand-shock correlations in Table 3.1 for all the specifications. The direction of the effect depends on the type of 
the shock, with the estimates suggesting that the circulation of the euro has caused supply shocks to become more   16 
correlated but has led to greater asymmetries of demand shocks. One explanation could be that, ceteris paribus, 
with a common currency, product-price differences across national economies tend to become more apparent, 
leading in the short run to shifts in relative demand schedules, which in turn appear as asymmetric demand shocks. 
Another  explanation  is  that  for  counties  sharing  a  common  currency,  the  direct  effect  of  monetary-policy 
convergence on demand-shock symmetry may be negative to the extent that these countries loose their ability to 
respond to idiosyncratic demand shocks, with only the indirect effect through trade being positive (that is, a 
common currency increases trade and this increase in trade induces shock convergence).  As far as fiscal policy is 
concerned, in columns (d),(e) and (i), (j) of Table 3.1 the estimated coefficients of BUDGET are all positive and 
significant, even when controlling for the euro effect, suggesting that the process of fiscal-policy convergence has 
reduced asymmetries of demand shocks across the EU27 member states. Fiscal-policy convergence, however, 
does not appear to have had any favourable impact on symmetry of supply-side shocks, and in columns (d),(e) and 
(i),(j) of Table 3.2 BUDGET has a negative and significant sign. The RATES variable enters in the regressions in 
Table 3.2 (columns (e) and (j)) with a minus sign, implying that interest-rate convergence (reduced discrepancies 
of interest rates) has had a positive effect on cross-country symmetry of supply shocks across the EU, something 
also consistent with the impact of EURO. But the effect is weak and insignificant. In the case of the demand 
shocks, RATES appears to have virtually no impact on demand-shock symmetry (columns (e) and (j) of Table 3.1). 
Indeed, in the context of the pooled EU27 sample considered in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the RATES effect can be 
expected to be weak as large fluctuations in short-term interest rates had occurred in several NM12 during the 
1995-2005 period and the RATES variable for this sample shows a large variance (see Table A.2). 
 Allowing for 
economic size (per capita GDP differences) also does not change much the results regarding the role of trade 
flows, with the estimated effects being similar for the two measures of the overall bilateral-trade intensity variable 
in (3)  (see Table 3.3). At the same time, the coefficients of DINC have wrong (negative) signs, and, except for 
columns (ii) and (iv) for the case of supply shocks, controlling for per-capita GDP differences does not improve 
the adjusted-R
2 of the regressions either. Thus, income differences per se are revealed to play no direct role as a 




       
       To further assess the robustness of our results, in Tables 4.1 and 5.1 we restrict our pooled sample to the 
EU15 group, while in Tables 4.2 and 5.2 we consider all the EU27 for the second sub-sample period 2001q1-
2005q4 (summary statistics for these two samples
 are
  shown in Tables A.3 and A.4 respectively
27). Focusing only 
on the second sub-sample period allows for potential bias in the results arising from the fact that trade data for the 
NM12 in the early years of the 1995q1-2005q4 period might not have been sufficiently reliable and also from the 
fact that in some of them structural changes might still have been taking place. On the other hand, considering 
only the EU15 allows for examining possible differences in behaviour between the two groups. However, the 
results concerning the effects of trade are not very different qualitatively from those in Tables 3.1 and 3.2: there 
are no large differences between the estimates across the three samples, except for the interest-rate effect and the 
larger goodness of fit of most of the regressions in the pooled EU15 sample. In particular, in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, in 
the regressions for demand-shock convergence, the overall bilateral-trade intensity coefficients are always positive 
and  highly  significant  across  the  two  samples  in  all  the  specifications,  even  when  controlling  for  policy   17 
convergence, while the coefficients of the intra-industry-trade variable are negative and significant (columns (b), 
(d)  and  (f),  (h))    or  relatively  small  in  absolute  value  and  insignificant  (columns  (a),(c)  and  (e),(g)).  In  the 
regressions for supply-shock convergence in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, again the coefficients of both measures of trade 
(overall  and  intra-industry)  have  the  expected  positive  signs,  with  the  intra-industry  variable  being  more 
significant than the overall bilateral-trade variable. In the EU15 sample the coefficients of overall bilateral-trade 
intensity in the demand-shock regressions drop a bit relative to Table 3.1, but the effect remains significant for all 
the specifications.  On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of both overall bilateral-trade intensity and intra-
industry trade in the supply-shock regressions are in general larger for the second half of the sample period (see 
columns (e) to (h) in Table 5.2 relative to columns (b),(e) and (g),(j) in Table 3.2)). This is an indication that the 
role of trade in supply-shock symmetry across Europe has increased in recent years. At the same time, Table 5.1 
reveals a strong positive relationship between symmetry of supply-side shocks across the EU15 and the circulation 
of  the  euro  and  Table  4.1  a  strong  positive  relationship  between  demand-shock  symmetry  and  fiscal-policy 
convergence. Across all three samples considered, fiscal-policy similarity does not appear to have exerted any 
positive effect on symmetry of supply shocks. By contrast, interest-rate convergence is revealed to have had a 
favourable impact on symmetry of both supply and demand shocks for the group of the EU15 member states: the 
coefficients of RATES are negative and statistically significant in Tables 4.1 and 5.1, indicating that interest-rate 
similarity has induced more symmetry of shocks in general among the EU15.  
 





As a successful expansion of EMU membership requires a sufficient degree of business cycle synchronization 
across the EU27, a pressing matter for European policymakers today is the extent to which synchronization of 
macroeconomic fluctuations across the twenty-seven member states is likely to increase in the near future. Since 
an  expanded  EMU  is  most  likely  to  boost  further  intra-European  trade,  if  trade  integration  is  to  facilitate 
convergence of business-cycles, the cost for the new member states (or the three non-eurozone EU15 countries) 
from loosing monetary independence will be relatively small. Thus, assessing the role of trade in cross-country 
synchronization of business-cycles across the EU27 has important implications for the success or failure of an 
expanded EMU.  
     In the international economics literature there is an ongoing debate regarding the effect of increased trade on 
business-cycle synchrony. Some authors argue that larger trade flows are likely to be accompanied by greater 
specialization  in  production  according  to  comparative  advantage,  thus  leading  to  less  synchronized 
macroeconomic  fluctuations  across  national  economies.  Others,  however,  stress  that  as  trade  integration 
progresses,  output  co-movements  across  countries  will  become  more  synchronized  through  productivity  and 
spending spill-overs and through intra-industry trade. The existing empirical evidence is mixed, with some studies 
indicating a large positive effect of more intense trade ties on business-cycle synchrony while others suggest a 
weak  association  between  trade  flows  and  synchronization.  Whether  overall  bilateral-trade  intensity  or  intra-
industry trade is the major channel through which national business cycles become synchronized is another point   18 
of disagreement in the literature. Opinions also diverge in the literature regarding the influence on synchronization 
of policy convergence.  
     Our results suggest that assessing the role of trade in business-cycle synchronization by simply looking at its 
impact on cross-country cyclical co-movements of output can be misleading because the cause of fluctuations in 
output is not taken into account. Using trade data from the EU27 countries and identifying structural demand and 
supply  shocks  in  these  economies  over  the  period  1995Q1-2005Q4  employing  the  Blanchard-Quah  (1989) 
structural  VAR  methodology,  we  have  found  evidence  suggesting  that  trade  flows  strongly  influence  the 
international transmission of business cycles but the way in which this occurs depends on the source of the shocks. 
Thus, as intra-industry trade becomes more dominant, synchrony of business cycles across the enlarged European 
Union would tend to increase if the main reason for them is a supply-side innovation. If the driving force of cycles 
is a demand innovation, the effect could be just the opposite, with business-cycle fluctuations across Europe 
becoming less correlated. On the other hand, increased overall trade, and thus higher bilateral-trade intensities, is 
found to have, on balance, correlation-increasing effects through international spill-overs, via productivity and 
income channels. Our results therefore provide evidence in support of a Frankel-Rose (1998) type of effect, rather 
than  a  Krugman-type  (1993)  specialization  effect,  regarding  the  association  between  trade  and  cross-country 
business cycle co-movements. This implies that a quick entry of all the new member states into the EMU may not 
be so costly in terms of a loss of monetary autonomy. Our results also suggest that the circulation of the euro has 
been associated with a fall in supply-shock asymmetries in Europe but has had no direct favourable impact on 
demand-shock  symmetry.  By  contrast,  the  process  of  fiscal-policy  convergence  appears  to  have  led  to  more 
symmetric demand shocks across the EU27 member states. Interest-rate convergence is revealed to have induced 





1.  Some  NM12  expressed  their  desire  to  join  the  EMU  soon  after  the  signing  of  the  Accession  Treaty. 
Slovenia joined the EMU in January 2007 and Cyprus and Malta became formal EMU members at the 
beginning of this year. A preliminary timetable for EMU entry has also been set for several other NM12. 
 
2.  See De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) for a recent discussion of the OCA theory. 
 
3.  See Rose and Engel (2002), Micco et al. (2003), Rose and Stanley (2005) and Baldwin (2005) for a survey 
of this literature. 
 
4.  Some other studies also find weak evidence that larger trade flows increase the synchrony of business 
cycles, see, for example, Kose et.al. (2003) and Canova and Dellas (1993). 
 
5.  Comparable  quarterly  real-GDP  series  for  the  EU15  are  available  only  from  1991q1  onwards,  while 
consistent bilateral trade data for all the EU27 are not available prior to 1995q1.  
 
6.  See Klaassen (2004) for a survey of the literature on the effects of exchange-rate volatility on trade. 
 
7.  For a discussion see De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) and Rose and Engel (2002). 
 
8.  Rose’s (2000) large estimate of the trade effect of currency unions was severely criticised. Many authors 
questioned the appropriateness of making generalizations from estimates derived from broad-based cross-
section studies like Rose (2000) because historically pairs of countries participating in currency unions 
either had strong political ties or were small and poor. Controlling for political ties in the Rose (2000)   19 
dataset, Melitz (2001) found a lower trade effect, amounting to about 200%. Also, Persson (2001) pointed 
to bias resulting from non-linear effects of some of the Rose (2000) explanatory variables and from the fact 
that  the  pairs  of  countries  involved  in  currency  unions  in  his  sample  were  non-random.  Using  non-
parametric methods, instead of standard regression techniques, he found a smaller effect of currency unions 
on trade, between 13% and 65%. Other authors pointed to the possibility of bias due to endogeneities and 
reverse causality. Accounting for potential endogeneity due to omitted variables, by explicitly allowing for 
the decision to participate in a currency union, Tenreyro (2001) estimated the currency-union effect on 
trade at 50%. However, Tenreyro and Barro (2003), using an instrumental-variable approach, found an 
effect larger than that in Glick and Rose (2002).  
 
9.  Some other authors proposed a time-series approach to the trade effects of currency unions, rather than a 
cross-sectional approach, stressing the importance of exploiting additional information based on individual-
country experience. Thom and Walsh (2002), for example, focused on the influence on the Irish trade of the 
break between sterling and the Irish pound in 1979 (when Ireland joined the European Monetary System). 
Their results suggested no significantly negative effect of such change in exchange-rate regime on the 
Anglo-Irish trade.  
 
10.  Much of this literature tests for the significance of coefficients on dummy variables from January 2000 
onwards  for  the  eurozone  countries.  See  Baldwin  and  Di  Nino  (2006)  for  a  different  approach, 
concentrating on the effects of the euro on trade in new products. 
 
11.  De Nardis and Vicarelli (2004) also suggest a larger longer-term effect of EMU on trade, of about 19%. 
Indeed, some authors argue that the smaller trade-effect of EMU compared to that implied from panel 
studies may be due to the fact that the EMU is a relatively new phenomenon and thus its full impact across 
Europe has yet to be seen. Others, however, point out that monetary integration in Europe has a long 
history and thus part of its effect has already worked through in the member states. Persson (2001) and 
Thom and Walsh (2002), for example, expressed doubts as to whether the EMU would have any significant 
trade effect. Nitsch and Berger (2005) have also questioned the argument that, by itself, the euro has 
increased trade, suggesting that any trade effect will soon fade away. 
 
12.  Indeed, in the last few years, several authors have argued in favour of a “euroization”, namely the adoption 
by all the new EU  member  states of the euro as legal tender even before their official entry into the 
eurozone (see, for example, Buiter and Grafe (2002) and Von Hagen and Traistaru (2006)).  
 
13.  The  structural-VAR  methodology  has  several  limitations.  It  assumes  structural  stability  regarding  the 
association between the variables under consideration, and it requires estimating many coefficients which is 
problematic in cases of relatively short samples. Also, in a structural-VAR model no distinction can be 
made between domestic and foreign shocks. Nevertheless, this methodology has been very popular in the 
international economics literature in recent years and has been employed by a number of studies to identify 
demand  and  supply  shocks  across  regions  or  countries.  See,  for  example,  Frenkel  and  Nickel  (2005), 
Korhonen (2003) and Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003, 2006). 
 
14.  The  assumption  that  the  structural  shocks  εd  and  εs  are  contemporaneously  orthogonal  is  the  standard 
approach  suggested  by  Blanchard  and  Quah  (1988)  and  employed  by  many  other  authors.  See  the 
references in footnote 13. 
 
15.  For some other NM12 the estimation period was also slightly shorter (see Table A.5).  
 
16.  This pattern of long-run inflation response (the so-called ‘over-identifying restriction’) is not imposed on 
the empirical model and its presence is an indication that the estimated VAR is consistent with an aggregate 
demand and supply framework, in the context of which positive demand shocks are expected to raise prices 
in the long run while positive supply shocks are expected to lower prices. See, for example, Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2003) and Frenkel and Nickel (2005).  
 
17.  An ADF test was performed for real GDP and GDP deflator. The hypothesis of a unit root could be rejected 
for the real-GDP growth and inflation series. 
 
18.  In the case of Denmark, the impulse response function showed a perverse long-run and short-run response 
of inflation to a supply shock and a perverse short-run response of output growth to a demand shock, and, 
in the light of this, this country was excluded from the subsequent regressions on shock convergence.
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19.  Exceptions are the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland and Romania for the case of demand shocks. For the 
Netherlands, the Jarque-Bera statistic also indicates deviations from normality for supply shocks. 
 
20.  In the regressions in Tables 3-5, τ corresponds to the respective shock-correlation period with a four-quarter 
lead to ensure a causative effect. 
 
21.  A major problem in studies examining the impact on output co-movements of trade flows is the possibility 
of simultaneity and reverse causality between business-cycle correlations and bilateral trade. To deal with 
this problem, most authors make use of instrumental variable estimation. However, this approach is not an 
adequate solution because the variables which, from gravity models, are commonly used as instruments for 
trade intensity (e.g. distance between the capitals of the trading partners, geographical adjacency and use of 
a common language) may also be reflecting the effects of other omitted variables, such as labour mobility 
and  similarity  of  economic  objectives,  in  which  case  the  estimates  will  be  seriously  biased  (see,  for 
example, Grubel et al. (2002) and Inklaar et.al. (2005)). For this reason, and also to account for factors 
affecting business-cycle synchrony that are difficult to measure, some authors, including Grubel et. al. 
(2002),  include  gravity  variables  directly  into  their  regressions.  For  the  same  reason,  other  authors, 
including Inklaar et.al.(2005), Bergman (2004) and Otto et.al. (2001), include policy variables, in addition 
to trade, in their regressions. Reverse causality is not a problem in this paper to the extent that the upward 
trend of intra-EU trade that has been observed in recent years cannot be attributed to shocks (Babetskii 
(2005) also makes the assumption that trade is exogenous to shocks). At the same time, the specifications in 
Tables  3-5  control  for  potential  simultaneity  in  so  far  as  policy-convergence  variables,  which  may 
themselves have affected symmetry of shocks independently of trade flows, are included directly in the 
regressions. For the same reason, in all the regressions, the period average for the explanatory variables, 
except EURO, has been computed with a four-quarter lead over the corresponding shock-correlation period.  
 
22.  A very detailed disaggregation (such as SITC-3) might not be appropriate since with the rise in the level of 
industry de-composition the share of intra-industry trade falls and the index eventually approaches zero. A 
very low level of disaggregation (e.g. SITC-1, which involves only 9 sectors) might also be inappropriate 
since it could give a misleading picture regarding the extent of intra-industry trade.  
 
23.  Comparable quarterly intra-industry-trade data at the SITC-2 level of disaggregation are not available prior 
to 1999q1 for the NM12. Thus, in the case of the NM12, (4) for the first sub-sample period is computed 
using data for 1999q1-2000q4. 
 
24.  See footnote 21. 
 
25.  The coefficients of overall bilateral-trade intensity are larger when GDP is used as the scaling variable. 
However, elasticities are not very different for the two measures of (3) as for all countries TRADE2 is 
smaller than TRADE1 (see Table A.2). 
 
26.  In the case of the demand-shock correlations in Table 3.3, introducing GDP differences also renders INTRA 
insignificant. This is because in the context of the pooled EU27 sample, trading partners showing small 
income differences are also the ones that show relatively high levels of bilateral intra-industry trade.  
 
27.  The summary statistics for TRADE1, TRADE2 and INTRA in Table A.4 are not directly comparable with 
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TABLE 3.1 Symmetry of demand shocks, trade flows and policy convergence, pooled sample EU27 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable: correlations of demand shocks 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
      Explanatory 
variables 
 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h )  (i)  (j) 
TRADE1
  3.598***  3.774***  3.832***  3.457***  3.223***           
  (0.649)  (0.746)  (0.759)  (0.867)  (0.925)           
TRADE2            6.723***  7.003***  7.317***  6.645***  5.982*** 
            (1.285)  (1.465)  (1.441)  (1.624)  (1.768) 
INTRA    -0.059  -0.112**  -0.144**  -0.096*    -0.055  -0.118**  -0.152***  -0.094* 
    (0.048)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.058)    (0.048)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.057) 
EURO      0.069*  0.066*        0.079**  0.075**   
      (0.037)  (0.037)        (0.037)  (0.037)   
BUDGET        0.063**  0.079**        0.064*  0.082** 
        (0.033)  (0.036)        (0.033)  (0.036) 
RATES             0.0005          0.0005 
          (0.004)          (0.004) 
                     

































    R-squared (adj)  0.144  0.142  0.157  0.178  0.159  0.141  0.139  0.160  0.182  0.158 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: OLS estimation; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (White-
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis); 
aIreland, Malta, Lithuania and Romania only  for 2001q1-2005q4 
and Denmark excluded;  
btrade data for Luxemburg not available for the first sub-sample period; 
cSlovakia excluded 
(frequent revisions in budget-deficit series); 




TABLE 3.2 Symmetry of supply shocks, trade flows and policy convergence, pooled sample EU27 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable: correlations of supply shocks 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
      Explanatory 
variables 
 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)  (i)  (j) 
TRADE1
  2.515***  1.688*  1.586*  2.066**  2.310**           
  (0.792)  (0.941)  (0.901)  (0.949)  (1.045)           
TRADE2            4.993***  3.529**  3.061*  3.900**  4.643** 
            (1.458)  (1.730)  (1.700)  (1.785)  (1.896) 
INTRA    0.159***  0.251***  0.281***  0.220***    0.152***  0.247***  0.278***  0.213*** 
    (0.058)  (0.070)  (0.074)  (0.78)    (0.058)  (0.071)  (0.075)  (0.078) 
EURO      -0.121***  -0.117***        -0.117***  -0.112***   
    (0.041)  (0.044)        (0.042)  (0.044)   
BUDGET        -0.070*  -0.103***        -0.069*  -0.102*** 
        (0.041)  (0.041)        (0.041)  (0.041) 
RATES             -0.004          -0.004 
          (0.004)          (0.004) 





























R-squared (adj)      0.054  0.068     0.115  0.138  0.106  0.060  0.073    0.115     0.138    0.110 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: OLS estimation; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (White-
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis); 
aIreland, Malta, Lithuania and Romania only  for 2001q1-2005q4 
and Denmark excluded;  
btrade data for Luxemburg not available for the first sub-sample period; 
cSlovakia excluded 
(frequent revisions in budget-deficit series) ; 
dcomparable interest-rate data for Luxemburg not available 
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TABLE 3.3   Symmetry of structural shocks and income differences, pooled sample EU27 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
  Dependent variable: 
  Correlations  of demand shocks 
             Dependent variable: 
            Correlations of  supply shocks 
Explanatory  
variables 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)    (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
TRADE1
    3.453***   3.361***        1.847*   1.834*     
  (0.875)  (0.898)        (1.058)   (1.121)     
TRADE2         6.054***    5.976***        3.477*  3.804* 
      (1.778)  (1.774)        (1.952)  (2.026) 
         INTRA    -0.136  -0.088  -0.109  -0.094    0.309***    0.299***   0.309***    0.288*** 
 (0.097)  (0.109)  (0.071)  (0.072)    (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.094) 
EURO   0.066*      0.085**      -0.110**    -0.105*   
    (0.037)    (0.41)      (0.048)       (0.049)   
BUDGET   0.064*    0.078**   0.061*    0.082**    -0.080*    -0.134***  -0.081*   -0.133*** 
   (0.034)  (0.036)   (0.030)  (0.042)    (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.049)  (0.046) 
RATES     0.0006    0.0005     -0.0003    -0.0002 
    (0.004)    (0.004)      (0.005)    (0.005) 
DINCD       -0.006  -0.013  -0.020  -0.0006            -0.026      -0.090     -0.029        -0.087 




     
 129
c 
   
 126
c,d 
   
 129
c 
   
 126
 c,d 
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 c 
 
   126
 c,d 






R-squared (adj)  0.171  0.153  0.179  0.151    0.132  0.111  0.133  0.114 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: : OLS estimation; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (White-
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis); 
aIreland, Malta, Lithuania and Romania only  for 2001q1-2005q4 
and Denmark excluded;  
btrade data for Luxemburg not available for the first sub-sample period; 
cSlovakia excluded 
(frequent revisions in budget-deficit series); 





      Table 4  Symmetry of demand shocks, trade flows and policy convergence 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                           Dependent variable:   correlations of demand shocks                          
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                4.1    pooled EU15 sample 
 
          4.2    EU27 sample, 2001q1-2005q4 
Explanatory  
variables 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d )    (e)  (f)  (g)  (h ) 
TRADE1
  2.735**  2.344**            3.410***  2.932***     
  (1.129)  (1.079)            (1.207)  (1.392)     
TRADE2        5.505***    4.299**         6.078***  5.241** 
      (2.051)  (1.998)        (2.167)  (2.481) 
INTRA  -0.062  -0.190*       -0.080  -0.187*       -0.085  -0.121*  -0.084  -0.120* 
  (0.086)  (0.101)  (0.086)  (0.097)       (0.058)  (0.070)  (0.057)  (0.068) 
EURO    0.126**    0.140**             
  (0.060)    (0.059)             
BUDGET    0.286***    0.288***      0.086*    0.086* 
    (0.067)    (0.067)      (0.047)    (0.047) 
RATES    -0.042***      -0.041***      0.003    0.003 
    (0.010)    (0.010)      (0.003)    (0.003) 
                   
No. of observations
 a,b  72  69
,d   72  69
,d       75  6
,9
c,d   75  69
,c,d 
     R-squared (adj)  0.121  0.243  0.132  0.242        0.108  0.138  0.110  0.140 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: : OLS estimation; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (White-
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis); 
aIreland, Malta, Lithuania and Romania only  for 2001q1-2005q4 
and Denmark excluded;  
btrade data for Luxemburg not available for the first sub-sample period; 
cSlovakia excluded 
(frequent revisions in budget-deficit series); 
dcomparable interest-rate data for Luxemburg not available   26 
 
 
TABLE 5 Symmetry of supply shocks, trade flows and policy convergence 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                           Dependent variable: correlations of supply shocks                      
___________________ ________________________________________________________________________________ 
          5.1     pooled  EU15 sample 
 
             5.2    EU27 sample, 2001q1-2005q4 
     
Explanatory  
variables 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d )    (e)  (f)  (g)  (h ) 
TRADE1
  2.247**  2.543**             2.428**      3.237**     
  (0.955)  (1.074)             (1.189)  (1.364)     
TRADE2      4.169**  5.024**        4.008*  5.329** 
      (1.819)  (2.024)        (2.130)  (2.460) 
INTRA  0.238***  0.262***  0.235***  0.253***        0.226***       0.256***  0.234***  0.267*** 
        (0.084)  (0.097)  (0.088)  (0.096)        (0.081)  (0.100)  (0.081)  (0.101) 
EURO  -0.167***       -0.156***             
  (0.051)    (0.052)             
BUDGET    -0.143**    -0.140***             -0.109*    -0.106* 
    (0.071)    (0.070)      (0.059)    (0.059) 
RATES    -0.021*    -0.019*            -0.005    -0.005 
    (0.011)    (0.011)      (0.003)    (0.005) 
                   
No. of observations
a,b      72     69
d     72
     69
d       75  6
 9
,c,d  75
      69
,c,d 
     R-squared (adj)  0.227  0.233  0.227  0.240    0.089  0.120  0.085  0.114 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: : OLS estimation; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (White-
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis); 
aIreland, Malta, Lithuania and Romania only  for 2001q1-2005q4 
and Denmark excluded;  
btrade data for Luxemburg not available for the first sub-sample period; 
cSlovakia excluded 
(frequent revisions in budget-deficit series); 
dcomparable interest-rate data for Luxemburg not available   27 
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                                     TABLE  A.1   Structural shocks, summary statistics 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                demand shocks
a                                                                      supply shocks
 a 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Country     min  max  Jarque-Bera
b         min  max  Jarque-Bera
 b 
AU  -2.424       1.379    1.296 
   (0.523) 
        -2.592     min  1.864 
(0.394) 
BE  -1.901  1.546  0.0002 
(0.998) 
    -1.884      -2.592  0.918 
(0.632) 
BU  -1.855  1.704  0.667 
(0.717) 
    -2.202  -1.884  2.498 
(0.287) 
CY  -1.647  2.260  0.850 
(0.654) 
    -2.549  -2.202  1.057 
(0.589) 
CZ  -1.760  1.922  1.149 
(0.563) 
    -2.248  -2.549  0.537 
(0.764) 
   EST  -1.456  1.476  0.634 
(0.728) 
    -1.826  -2.248  0.054 
(0.974) 
FIN  -2.069  1.858  1.728 
(0.422) 
    -2.071  -1.826  1.182 
(0.554) 
FR  -1.977  2.532  1.741 
(0.419) 
    -2.035  -2.071  0.461 
(0.794) 
GER  -1.469  2.525  2.353 
(0.308) 
    -1.723  -2.035  1.197 
(0.550) 
GR  -2.528  1.694  3.652 
(0.161) 
    -1.943  -1.723  0.439 
(0.803) 
   HU  -2.263  1.883  0.681 
(0.711) 
    -2.884  -1.943  4.028 
(0.133) 
IR
   -1.307  2.047  1.305 
(0.521) 
    -2.468  -2.884  2.531 
(0.282) 
IT  -1.632  1.156  0.308 
 (0.857) 
    -1.897  -2.468  0.0155 
(0.992) 
LAT  -1.609     1.734     1.428 
   (0.490) 
       -1.520  -1.897  0.843 
(0.656) 
 LITH  -2.116    1.465      0.858 
    (0.651) 
       -2.430     -1.520  0.392 
(0.822) 
LU  -1.769     1.702    1.545 
   (0.462) 
       -1.658     -2.430     1.218 
    (0.544) 
MA  -2.075    1.465     0.973 
   (0.615) 
       -1.638     -1.658      0.640 
   (0.727) 
NETH  -1.610     3.959     58.185 
   (0.000) 
       -3.712     -1.638     44.539    
    (0.000) 
POL    -1.364     2.720      46.481 
   (0.000) 
    -1.504     -1.547  2.601 
(0.272) 
POR    -2.393  2.180  1.518 
(0.468) 
    -2.377  -2.066  2.604 
(0.272) 
ROM    -1.385  2.796  12.031 
(0.002) 
    -1.889  -2.377  0.219 
(0.896) 
SLOV    -1.505  1.931  1.564 
(0.457) 
    -1.594  -1.889  3.476 
(0.176) 
SK    -2.130  1.453  1.114 
(0.573) 
    -2.123  -1.594  1.534 
(0.464) 
SP    -1.640  2.293  1.134 
(0.567) 
    -1.454  -2.123  3.209 
(0.201) 
SWE    -2.691  1.315  8.644 
 (0.013) 
    -1.682  -1.454  3.979 
(0.137) 
UK   -1.881  1.637  0.636 
(0.728) 
    -1.760  -1.682  0.674 
(0.714) 
eurozone    -2.704  1.740  3.843 
(0.146) 
    -1.644  -1.760  0.694 
(0.707) 
              -1.644   
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
aDenmark not reported;  
bp-values in parenthesis 
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TABLE A.2  Summary statistics, pooled EU27 sample 
___________________________________________________________________________ 




































             
mean  0.0430  0.1193  0.0209  0.0109  0.5481  0.3749  3.2111  0.4605 
min  -0.5116  -0.4216  0.0001  0.0001  0.0803  -0.9863  0.0000  0.0091 
max  0.6768  0.6979  0.1346  0.0717  0.8590  0.9903  24.320  1.4574 
Standard 
deviation  0.2485  0.2738  0.0268  0.0142  0.2018  0.6278  5.0680  0.4245 
   Observations  135  135  135  135  135  129
c  129
d  135 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
aIreland, Malta, Lithuania and Romania only in the second sub-sample period and Denmark excluded;
  btrade data 
for Luxemburg not available for the first sub-sample period; 
cSlovakia excluded (frequent revisions in budget-deficit 
series); 






TABLE A.3 Summary statistics, pooled EU15 sample 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 





































             
mean  0.1189  0.1374  0.0355  0.0185  0.6217  0.7101  0.9536  0.1546 
min  -0.4470  -0.4084  0.0038  0.0017  0.2467  -0.5488  0.0000  0.0090 
max  0.6767  0.6840  0.1346  0.0717  0.8590  0.9902  8.8000  0.7533 
Standard 
deviation  0.2605  0.2748  0.0294  0.0157  0.1593  0.3735  1.7511  0.1798 
    Observations  72  72  72  72  72  72  69
c  72 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
aIreland only in the second sub-sample period and Denmark excluded;
  btrade data for Luxemburg not available for 
the first sub-sample period;  






TABLE A.4 Summary  statistics, all EU27 2001q1-2005q4 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 




































                       
mean  0.0012  0.1718  0.0193  0.0107  0.5450  0.2502  2.3075  0.4586 
min  -0.5116  -0.4215  0.0002  0.0001  0.0809  -0.9570  0.0000  0.0114 
max  0.6310  0.6979  0.1277  0.0717  0.8449  0.9801  24.320  1.3444 
Standard 
deviation  0.2310  0.2862  0.0253  0.0143  0.1939  0.6443  5.0319  0.4039 
     Observations  75  75  75  75  75  72
b  72
c  75 
_______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: 
a Denmark excluded; 
bSlovakia excluded (frequent revisions in budget-deficit series); 
  c comparable interest-rate data 
for Luxemburg not available 
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Real GDP quarterly, 
(1995 prices) and  
GDP- deflator quarterly 
(1995=100) 
total  trade  
quarterly, 
millions of euro 
 
 nominal GDP  
quarterly, 
millions of euro 
 
bilateral trade   
    quarterly, 




millions of euro, 
SITC-2 
AU  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
BE  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
BU  1998q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
CY  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
CZ  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
DEN  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
    EST  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
FIN  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
FR  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
GER  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
GR  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
   HU  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
IR  1999q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
IT  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
LAT  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
LITH  1999q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
MA  1999q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
LU  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4  1999q1-2005q4 
NETH  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4  1995q1-2005q4 
POL      1996q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1999q1-2005q4 
POR      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4 
ROM       1999q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1999q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1999q1-2005q4 
SLOV       1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1999q1-2005q4 
SK      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1999q1-2005q4 
SP      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4 
SWE      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4 
UK      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4      1995q1-2005q4 
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